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TOWARD A NATIONAL RESILIENCE FUND
Paul Rose
ABSTRACT—COVID-19’s economic impact has been catastrophic for state
and local governments. By Federal Reserve estimates, income and sales
revenues will have declined by over $50 billion in fiscal year 2020 and may
decline by as much as $137 billion in 2021. Pandemics are, of course, not
the only catastrophic risks we may face in coming years. Financial crises,
natural disasters, social justice crises, and climate change-related
catastrophes all present serious risks, and often have a compounding effect
on one another. These risks are especially salient for state and local
governments, which are at the forefront of crisis response. A government’s
legitimacy is tested and measured by its ability to respond to these
challenges, but existing state and local financial frameworks have proven too
thin and brittle to absorb shocks like COVID-19 or the Financial Crisis of
2007. This Essay describes how a national resilience fund, with subaccounts
created for each state and territory, would strengthen the ability of state and
local governments to respond to crises that will likely arise in the coming
years. A national resilience fund could be based on a familiar, flexible
structure that has been used for decades: the Unemployment Trust Fund.
Such a structure would help insulate the resilience fund from local political
pressures yet would have the financial strength to help state and local
governments absorb the costs associated with severe crises such as
pandemics and natural disasters, thereby helping to preserve the
government’s legitimacy in times of severe social stress.
AUTHOR—Robert J. Watkins/Procter & Gamble Professor of Law, Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law. Thanks to Sam Mallory for
excellent research assistance and to Cinnamon Carlarne and Diego Lopez for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to the Northwestern
University Law Review Online staff for their outstanding editorial work.
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INTRODUCTION
COVID-19’s economic impact will reverberate throughout the country
for years to come. Estimates suggest that global government deficits could
be as high as $30 trillion by 2023.1 The pandemic has severely impacted
every state and city in the United States—most importantly through loss of
life but also through decreased economic prospects. 2 Reduced economic
activity will negatively impact public services as tax revenues decrease and
thereby limit state and local governments’ ability to provide their typical
services including health care, public safety services, and public sector

1

COVID-19: Briefing Note #10: June 18, 2020, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 18, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/covid-19-implications-for-business
[https://perma.cc/ND5T-F4EC]. As a point of comparison, this was roughly the combined market value
of all publicly traded U.S. firms at the end of 2018. Total Market Value of U.S. Stock Market, SIBLIS
RSCH., https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-market-value/ [https://perma.cc/KTR7-P2NX] (reporting
an approximate value of $30,102,771,200,000).
2
This is not to suggest that all countries will suffer from COVID-19 equally, just that all countries
will experience serious loss as a result of the pandemic. As IMF analyst Gita Gopinath notes:
This is a truly global crisis as no country is spared. Countries reliant on tourism, travel, hospitality,
and entertainment for their growth are experiencing particularly large disruptions. Emerging
market and developing economies face additional challenges with unprecedented reversals in
capital flows as global risk appetite wanes, and currency pressures, while coping with weaker
health systems, and more limited fiscal space to provide support. Moreover, several economies
entered this crisis in a vulnerable state with sluggish growth and high debt levels.
Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, IMFBLOG
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-sincethe-great-depression/ [https://perma.cc/86CH-RETQ].
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employment.3 The resulting human costs are difficult to quantify, but are
clearly not limited to those directly affected by the virus.4
Pandemics are, of course, not the only catastrophes we will face in the
coming years. Financial crises, natural disasters, and catastrophic climate
change-related events all present serious risks.5 These risks are especially
salient for state and local governments, which are “at the forefront of the
response . . . in their communities and will likely need to increase their
typical spending to provide crucial public health services.”6 Austerity is a
poor plan for long-term economic health, as reduction in services by state
and local governments can be “a substantial restraint on the vigor of the

3
It has been suggested that COVID-19 may have a positive effect on climate change due to a
reduction in pollution associated with decreased economic activity. A study in Nature Climate Change
suggests that daily fossil CO2 emissions during periods of forced confinement will range from –11% to 25%. Corinne Le Quéré, Robert B. Jackson, Matthew W. Jones, Adam J.P. Smith, Sam Abernethy,
Robbie M. Andrew, Anthony J. De-Gol, David R. Willis, Yuli Shan, Josep G. Canadell, Pierre
Friedlingstein, Felix Creutzig & Glen P. Peters, Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions
During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 652 (2020). However,
the study also notes that the “associated annual decrease will be much lower (–4.2 to -7.5% according to
our sensitivity tests), which is comparable to the rates of decrease needed year-on-year over the next
decades to limit climate change to a 1.5°C warming.”. Id. Similarly, the World Health Organization
(WHO) reports reduced economic activity and temporary improvements in air quality in some areas
resulting from efforts to control the pandemic but persistence of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Climate Change, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-on-climate-change-and-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/SB2W-J235]. The reductions associated with forced confinement have only a limited
effect on overall atmospheric concentrations of CO2. Id. Additionally, even with the lockdown, CO2 levels
in the first months of 2020 have been higher than 2019. Id. A rapid restart to the economy may also create
an emissions spike “unless there is a clear focus to promote equity, environmental health, around a just
transition to a green economy.” Id.
4
In comparison to the Financial Crisis, which resulted in a global reduction of 0.1% in 2009 real
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the “Great Lockdown” is expected to result in a 3% GDP
reduction, making it the “worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global
Financial Crisis.” Gopinath, supra note 2. And while world economies may recover quickly once the
pandemic is controlled, the cumulative loss to global GDP in 2020 and 2021 alone may be around $9
trillion—the approximate size of the economies of Germany and Japan combined. Id.; see also INT’L
MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: THE GREAT LOCKDOWN 5 (2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020 [https://perma.cc/Z372-9
PMZ] (projecting global growth impacts “far worse than during the 2009 global financial crisis”).
5
The winter storm power crisis in Texas highlights these risks and their attendant danger to
governmental legitimacy. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, A Glimpse of America’s Future: Climate Change
Means Trouble for Power Grids, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/
climate/texas-power-grid-failures.html [https://perma.cc/3SSP-R7G7] (detailing the risks that climate
change poses to power grids across the United States).
6
Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is COVID-19 Hurting State and Local Revenues?,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/24/how-much-is-covid19-hurting-state-and-local-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/N6B6-R4PA].
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economic recovery.” 7 As noted in a McKinsey report, during the Great
Recession:
Despite enlisting their full arsenal of austerity measures, states were pushed to
a breaking point by the cumulative burden. . . . Others cut elementary- and
secondary-education funding by as much as 40 percent, leading many districts
to reduce the number of school days and furlough employees. Between 2008
and 2013, state-government workforces were reduced by about 6 percent, and
the average state-pension funding ratio fell to 75 percent. And, even though the
federal government injected about $1.3 trillion into the economy as part of the
largest fiscal recovery plan in US history (at the time), states were still left with
challenging decisions.8

Perhaps even more importantly, a reduction in vital services can also expose
and exacerbate inequality, further eroding confidence in governmental
institutions and wearing away the government’s legitimacy in a moment
already fraught with challenges.9
This Essay sets out the need for a robust public fund to bridge state and
local financial gaps in times of crisis. Such a tool, operating within a
federalist framework, would allow states to draw from the fund to meet state
and local financing needs.10 Part I discusses the importance of maintaining
7
Id. In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007, instead of attempting to stimulate the economy,
European countries generally attempted to reduce government spending—implementing strict “austerity”
policies—that resulted in stunted economic growth and adverse health outcomes. Martin McKee, Marina
Karanikolos, Paul Belcher & David Stuckler, Austerity: A Failed Experiment on the People of Europe,
12 CLINICAL MED. 346, 346 (2012); Nadia Daar & Nona Tamale, A Virus of Austerity? The COVID-19
Spending, Accountability, and Recovery Measures Agreed Between the IMF and Your Government,
OXFAM INT’L (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.oxfam.org/en/blogs/virus-austerity-covid-19-spendingaccountability-and-recovery-measures-agreed-between-imf-and [https://perma.cc/MCE9-642M].
8
Trey Childress, Ian Jefferson, Aly Spencer & Todd Wintner, The State Transformation Mandate
During COVID-19, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 15, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/publicsector/our-insights/the-state-transformation-mandate-during-covid-19# [https://perma.cc/9G8E-UUXT].
9
As an example, public services spending cuts associated with austerity measures have created
concerns of a “lost decade” with rising inequality and poverty. TERESA CAVERO & KRISNAH POINASAMY,
A CAUTIONARY TALE: THE TRUE COST OF AUSTERITY AND INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 3 (2013),
https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp174-cautionary-tale-austerity-inequalityeurope-120913-en_1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4K-FMY5].
10
There are numerous national funds already managed by the federal government, and some have
called for a national sovereign development fund. The most thorough and convincing case for such a fund
is made by Saule Omarova and Robert Hockett. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova,
Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018)
(describing and advocating for the creation of a “National Investment Authority”). While a sovereign
development fund may serve an important role in helping to manage long-term risks and transition costs
associated with climate change (among other concerns), it would not be as effective in helping to absorb
short-term systemic shocks. This is because sovereign development funds typically invest in less liquid
projects such as infrastructure projects. Indeed, the raison d’être of a sovereign development fund is longterm investment in public-goods projects that tend to not have sufficient private investment interest. See
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key social services in order to preserve governmental legitimacy, particularly
in times of crisis. This Part argues first that the ability to manage these crises
is essential to upholding the social contract. Second, it explains that the high
probability of future crises necessitates additional financial preparation at the
federal level through a dedicated public fund.
In Part II, the Essay describes the various interventions that have been
used to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic—the most recent
major test of governmental financial resiliency.11 At the federal level, the
CARES Act attempted to provide some support to state and local
governments, and the Federal Reserve and other central banks have also
established a variety of programs to help support economies during the
crisis. 12 At the state level, rainy day funds helped manage some of the
pandemic’s budgetary impacts.13 However, these measures have proven to
be inadequate. The primary CARES Act support mechanism for state and
local governments—the Municipal Liquidity Facility—has not operated as
planned.14 Moreover, most existing state rainy day funds have already been
drained.15 With the end of the pandemic not yet in sight, more climate and
public health disasters are sure to come before these funds can be
replenished.
Unlike these ad hoc interventions, an ex ante national resilience fund,
if properly structured, will ensure that resources can be deployed faster than
through ex post legislation. This would allow state and local governments to
potentially avoid or minimize some of the risks associated with a major
catastrophe. Because these funds are established ex ante, they are built into
the government’s budget structure through the legislative process. 16 By
contrast, ex post legislation borrows from future generations who do not have
the ability to vote on the imposition of the debt.
Part III sketches out the possibility of a national fund and reintroduces
a proposal modeled after the Unemployment Trust Fund. This fund, which I
label a “national resilience fund,” would help state and local governments

HÅVARD HALLAND, MICHEL NOËL, SILVANA TORDO & JACOB J. KLOPER-OWENS, STRATEGIC
INVESTMENT FUNDS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 2, 16–17 (World Bank, Pol’y Rsch., Working
Paper No. 7851, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235311475681523659/pdf/WPS78
51.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXT2-AHV8].
11
See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text.
12
Sheiner & Campbell, supra note 6 (explaining CARES Act funding and the Federal Reserve’s
Municipal Liquidity Facility).
13
See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 54–67 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
16
This point should not diminish the importance of ex ante preparations of other types, including
investment in, for example, initiatives to reduce inequality or adapt to changing climate conditions.
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manage severe short-term crises, such as pandemics and natural disasters, by
providing the financial resources necessary to maintain essential public
services while responding to the crisis. This assistance has two key benefits.
First, it helps governments sustain mitigation efforts that may help prevent
significant future costs. 17 Second, maintenance of services allows
governments to maintain legitimacy and public trust in times of crisis.
I.

RESILIENCE AND LEGITIMACY

The government’s authority to govern—and the corresponding
willingness of the citizenry to obey—is based on “a belief by virtue of which
persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”18 This belief in government
authority is premised on both its power to exert that authority, as well as on
the maintenance of its social contract with citizens. 19 The social contract
implicitly comes with an expectation that the government will exercise its
authority in a way that secures basic services for its people, 20 including

17
The benefit of early mitigation efforts in a crisis such as a pandemic can be seen with the use of
the WHO’s “Contingency Fund for Emergencies,” created after the 2014 Ebola crisis. Comparing the
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which triggered formation of the Contingency Fund for Emergencies
(CFE), with the 2017 outbreak in Congo the CFE subsequently helped to manage, the WHO states:

The contrast between the 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreak and the 2014
West Africa Ebola epidemic is stark. The former claimed four lives, lasted two months, and cost
US [$]2 million to contain. The latter claimed more than 11 000 lives over almost two years, at a
cost of more than US [$]3.6 billion. Clearly no single factor can account for such a vast disparity
in mortality and morbidity between two outbreaks. But equally, there can be no doubt that the
speed of the response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the decisive factor in the swift
containment of the outbreak — something that would simply not have been possible without the
CFE.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONTINGENCY FUND FOR EMERGENCIES: ENABLING QUICK ACTION TO SAVE
LIVES 5 (2018), https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contributions/cfe-impact-report-web2018.pdf
?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/TFX4-YXGW].
18
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 382 (Talcott Parsons ed.,
A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 2009); see also Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STAN.
ENCYC. PHIL. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/2HQ26K2C] (explaining some of the various conceptions of, and debates surrounding, political legitimacy).
19
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (discussing the structure
of society and idea of a legitimate government under a social contract theory). A social contract theory
was articulated by Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 work Leviathan and has been expanded and debated by
political philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls among many others. Fred D’Agostino,
Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL.
(May 31, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ [https://perma.cc/5W
7P-MY5H].
20
See WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017: GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW 31
(2017) (“When a government repeatedly delivers on its commitments, it legitimizes itself, such as by
reliably providing public services.”).
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services supporting social order.21 As described by Clark and Monk, “state
legitimacy depends upon the extent to which government meets the
fundamental interests of its citizens, and the extent to which it can claim a
sphere of autonomy.”22 In order to maintain legitimacy with its citizens, it is
pivotal that a government be able to provide key services during crises,
during which an extensive use of government resources—including direct
health care, medical equipment, and health infrastructure—is especially
required to develop long-term solutions to the crisis. A natural disaster, for
example, requires resources and coordination to reestablish “community
lifelines,” including food, clean water, and medical care.23 By contrast, when
the government fails to provide that “fundamental interest” and is perceived
as illegitimate, societies frayed by pandemics or racial injustice may
completely unravel.24
Crises—even pandemics, which by definition affect societies around
the world—typically require extensive local and state management. While
the legitimacy of the federal government may be impacted by its response to
crises, state and local governments typically shoulder the burden of disaster
with the federal government providing a supporting role. As described by
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Disasters always occur at the local level. For some types of natural disasters,
like slow rising floods or approaching hurricanes, warning is available. Other
disasters, like earthquakes, happen with little or no warning. The citizens in the
area where the event occurs and their local governments and voluntary agencies
are the first to have to cope with the damage.25

21
Philip Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 59,
65 (2012).
22
Gordon L. Clark & Ashby Monk, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC):
Insurer of Last Resort and Bulwark of Nation-State Legitimacy, 23 PAC. REV. 429, 431 (2010).
23
Under the National Response Framework, providing community lifelines ensures “continuous
operation of critical government and business functions and is essential to human health and safety or
economic security.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 8 (4th ed.
2019). Community lifelines include safety and security; food, water, shelter; health and medical services;
energy (power & fuel); communications; transportation; and hazardous material. Id.
24
The protests following the killing of George Floyd illustrate this fraying of American
governmental legitimacy. As discussed by Patrick Eddington, “the longstanding and ongoing targeting of
[B]lack Americans by that still white‐dominated power structure . . . has brought the country to a place
where people of color increasingly see American governmental institutions as corrupt, unaccountably
violent, and thus illegitimate.” Patrick G. Eddington, Race, Violence, and Political Illegitimacy,
DEFENDING RTS. & DISSENT (June 10, 2020), https://rightsanddissent.org/news/race-violence-andpolitical-illegitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/F9JQ-YH57].
25
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT COURSE – IS 208, at 3.4,
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is208sdmunit3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9E9-6PCM].
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However, local governments typically cannot marshal the resources
necessary to manage catastrophes such as pandemics and natural disasters.26
Furthermore, local governments usually cannot directly access federal
programs. 27 State governments are essential intermediaries between the
federal and local governments; they are large enough to marshal resources
but also more localized and responsive to local needs, more knowledgeable
of available local resources, and arguably more accountable to local voters
than federal governments. As noted by James Madison in Federalist No. 45,
this notion of state control is grounded in the American federalist system, in
which “[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.” 28 Because of this federal system—and the
supporting role that FEMA and other government agencies provide in times
of severe crisis—the federal government’s legitimacy is inextricably linked
to the operation and resiliency of state and local governments.
That local, state, and federal governmental legitimacy will be tested in
the coming years is underscored by four current intersecting crises: the
COVID-19 pandemic, the racial justice crisis, economic dislocation due to
globalization, and the climate crisis. All of these crises are expected to
continue and even worsen, 29 resulting in major societal impacts that will
require strong responses and transformative efforts at both the state and local
levels.
Future crises may not be entirely predictable in both timing and
magnitude, but pandemics, economic crises, and climate-related disasters are
nonetheless highly probable events.30 The current COVID-19 pandemic and
26

See infra notes 77–89 and accompanying text.
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 25, at 3.6.
28
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
29
See, e.g., Henry Fountain, Climate Change Is Accelerating, Bringing World ‘Dangerously Close’
to Irreversible Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/
climate-change-acceleration.html [https://perma.cc/FA2R-WYYW] (describing how the climate crisis
will continue to worsen); Nina Lakhani, Killer Heat: US Racial Injustices Will Worsen as Climate Crisis
Escalates, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/28/usracial-injustices-will-worsen-climate-crisis-escalates [https://perma.cc/5FUG-2HN8].
30
For example, noting at least two influenza pandemics in each of the past three centuries, Hill,
Tildesley, and House argue that “[b]eing prepared to experience several pandemics a century could ensure
a quicker, cheaper and more efficient response to the threat posed by this disease.” Edward Hill, Michael
Tildesley & Thomas House, How Predictable Are Flu Pandemics?, 14 SIGNIFICANCE 28, 29 tbl.1, 33
(2017). Similarly, historical evidence suggests that the economic system is “vulnerable to predictable
boom-bust cycles driven by credit expansion and asset price growth.” Robin Greenwood, Samuel G.
Hanson, Andrei Shleifer & Jakob Ahm Sørensen, Predictable Financial Crises 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27396, 2020). As a result, the authors argue that “policymakers should consider
prophylactic policy interventions that lean against the wind.” Id.
27
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climate-related crises provide evidence of both the probability of future
crises as well as evidence of the ways in which these crises challenge
government legitimacy, especially when basic services that protect citizen
health and safety are in short supply.
For example, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s concerns about the
city’s ability to provide basic services threatened city government
legitimacy. De Blasio stated that given the likely $10 billion deficit related
to COVID-19 in New York’s budget over 2020 and 2021, New York City
would not be able to “provide basic services and actually have a normal
society.” 31 De Blasio’s initial handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has
drawn sharp criticism from New Yorkers and onlookers alike who question
whether the city’s government was equipped to handle such a crisis.32
Another example can be drawn from the recent fires in California.
Despite extensive local government preparation for wildfires, the state
government of California had to request additional emergency resources
from other states and the federal government during this past year’s
catastrophic fires.33 The strain on California’s mutual aid system resulting
from the fires made it difficult for state and local governments to get
firefighting resources, both in- and out-of-state, to fight the fires.34
It is the high probability of future crises that justifies planning and
mitigation and distinguishes them from “Black Swan” events, a term
popularized by Nassim Nicholas Taleb intended to refer to outlier events for
which no government could plan.35 Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic, while

31
Sarah Hansen, Coronavirus Crisis Has Cost NYC up to $10 Billion: ‘Basic Services’ at Risk as De
Blasio Pleads for More Federal Aid, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
sarahhansen/2020/04/15/coronavirus-crisis-has-cost-nyc-up-to-10-billion-basic-services-at-risk-as-deblasio-pleads-for-more-federal-aid/?sh=5892e67647a1 [https://perma.cc/68WY-B2B2].
32
See David Freedlander, When New York Needed Him Most, Bill De Blasio Had His Worst Week
as Mayor, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/billde-blasio-had-his-worst-week-as-new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/S6TN-UDNB]; Charles
Duhigg, Seattle’s Leaders Let Scientists Take the Lead. New York’s Did Not, NEW YORKER (Apr. 26,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/04/seattles-leaders-let-scientists-take-the-leadnew-yorks-did-not [https://perma.cc/2FML-E5AH]; Jeffery C. Mays & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor
Resisted Drastic Steps on Virus. Then Came a Backlash from His Aides., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/nyregion/coronavirus-bill-de-blasio.html [https://perma.cc/3AYA
-N7QJ].
33
See Taryn Luna, California Firefighting Resources ‘Stretched’ by 23 Major Wildfires, Newsom
Says, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020, 8:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-19/
california-resources-stretched-23-wildfires [https://perma.cc/S9PU-VV3H].
34
Id.
35
In his 2007 book The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb popularized the term “Black Swan
event,” which refers to a catastrophic event with three key attributes:
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certainly a catastrophe by any calculation, was not an unpredictable event.36
The risk of a global pandemic was not only contemplated; it was expected.37
As a New Yorker article put it, the pandemic was “wholly predictable—
[Taleb], like Bill Gates, Laurie Garrett, and others, had predicted it—a white
swan if ever there was one.”38
When governments face crises such as climate-related disasters,
societal upheavals in response to injustice, pandemics, and economic
dislocation, they will need to be financially prepared to quickly and
effectively mitigate negative impacts. A resilience fund may, like other types
of reserve funds, function as a “bulwark of nation-state legitimacy” 39 by
enabling a state to insulate itself against economic instability, in key part by
bridging existing rifts and chasms between federal, state, and local resources
and responses. Moreover, as these events often have compounding effects
that reinforce and exacerbate one another, the need for a more resilient public
finance structure has never been greater.
II. FINANCING CRISIS RELIEF
At the core of any successful crisis response, whether to a pandemic, a
natural disaster, or an economic crisis, is a robust legal and financial
framework that can quickly deploy funds to support relief efforts and rebuild
the economic infrastructure.40 This Part first describes some of the federal
interventions used to mitigate catastrophes affecting state and local
governments. It also explains why these interventions have largely been
inadequate for COVID-19’s demands and will likely be inadequate in the

First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the
past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact . . . . Third, in
spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the
fact, making it explainable and predictable.
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xxii (2d ed.
2010).
36
Bernard Avishai, The Pandemic Isn’t a Black Swan but a Portent of a More Fragile Global System,
NEW YORKER: DAILY COMMENT (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the
-pandemic-isnt-a-black-swan-but-a-portent-of-a-more-fragile-global-system [https://perma.cc/9VAC6XK5] (quoting Taleb from an interview in which he stated, “[w]e issued our warning that, effectively,
you should kill [COVID-19] in the egg”).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Clark & Monk, supra note 22.
40
See, e.g., Dalvinder Singh & John Raymond LaBrosse, Developing a Framework for Effective
Financial Crisis Management, 2011 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 125, 129–30 (2012) (noting that, for
example, a central bank must provide liquidity “decisively and quickly without hesitation, otherwise a
panic could be prolonged and spread into other parts of the financial system which were unaffected by
the original problem”).
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face of expected future catastrophes. Second, this Part details state “rainy
day funds” and why they are also insufficient in the face of a widescale crisis.
A. Federal Interventions
Federal crisis interventions are primarily ad hoc efforts that may not
occur until weeks or even months after a crisis. The federal financial
response to the COVID-19 pandemic provides a lens through which we can
examine a typical ad hoc federal crisis response. Comparatively, the federal
response to COVID-19 was relatively swift. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act (CARES Act),41 which was enacted on March
27, 2020, included numerous provisions to help both individuals and
businesses during the early stages of the pandemic. Although the CARES
Act arrived in an unusually timely fashion,42 its primary problem was that it
did not sufficiently support state and local budgets. Additional federal
assistance through the Federal Reserve, while important, also proved to be
inadequate support at the state and local level.
The CARES Act provided small business interruption loans of up to
$10 million, the proceeds of which could be used for payroll support
(including paid sick, medical, or family leave, and group health care benefit
costs), employee salaries, rent or mortgage payments, utilities, and existing
debt obligations.43 The Act also provided “recovery rebates” for individual
tax filers 44 with an estimated average payout of $1,523. 45 The Act also
contained, among other things, provisions designed to reduce or delay

41
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)
[hereinafter CARES Act].
42
Even the CARES Act, which was passed fairly quickly, was not signed into law until nearly two
weeks after President Donald Trump declared the pandemic a national emergency. A Timeline of COVID19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/atimeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020
[https://perma.cc/DP46-L6MB].
Some
government
programs are designed to provide a more rapid response, such as the Disaster Relief Fund, which as of
the end of fiscal year 2019 carried a balance of $29 billion. WILLIAM L. PAINTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R45484, THE DISASTER RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES ii (2020). However, this too is an
inadequate resource. Designed to help manage the costs of natural disasters, it is often dwarfed by yearly
cyclone costs alone, which average $21.5 billion in damage for each event. Fast Facts: Hurricane Costs,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fastfacts/hurricane-costs.html [https://perma.cc/CCJ6-47JV]. Unlike the Disaster Relief Fund, however, the
fund proposed here would not be circumscribed by a narrow definition of “disaster” as a natural
catastrophe and would not be subject to a presidential determination of an emergency.
43
CARES Act § 1102(a).
44
CARES Act § 2201.
45
Garrett Watson, Taylor LaJoie, Huaqun Li & Daniel Bunn, Congress Approves Economic Relief
Plan for Individuals and Businesses, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/cares-actsenate-coronavirus-bill-economic-relief-plan/ [https://perma.cc/W2BW-6EE4].
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business taxes 46 and personal taxes, 47 provisions to manage medical
equipment and drug supplies, 48 and provisions for “severely distressed
sectors”—passenger air carriers, cargo air carriers, and other businesses
which incurred losses to the point that continued operations were
“jeopardized.”49
As previously noted, however, the ex post CARES Act did not
adequately support state and local budgets and may have a long-term impact
on the U.S. economy. For one, as in the 2007 Financial Crisis,50 the bailouts
for severely distressed businesses came with strings attached: the Secretary
of the Treasury was authorized by the legislation to enter into contracts with
businesses receiving funding through the loan program so that, depending on
the financial success of the eligible business, the government could aid in the
business’s further gains through various mechanisms such as warrants, stock
options, and common or preferred stock.51 These “strings” thus cut into state
and local business profits during a time when local economies were already
deeply hurting. Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the previously unplanned-for allocation of federal funds through the CARES
Act will increase federal deficits by about $1.7 trillion over the 2020–2030
period, with a $988 billion increase in mandatory expenditures under the Act,
a $408 billion decrease in revenues, and a $326 billion increase in
“discretionary” expenditures.52 Together, these effects may have a long-term
impact on the health of the U.S. economy.

46

CARES Act §§ 2301–2308.
CARES Act § 2102.
48
CARES Act § 3102.
49
CARES Act § 4003.
50
In the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Treasury was authorized to purchase
“troubled asset[s]” from publicly traded financial institutions on the condition that Treasury receive “a
warrant giving the right to the Secretary to receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock in such
financial institution.” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 § 113(d)(1). The purpose of the requirement was to “provide for reasonable participation by the
Secretary, for the benefit of taxpayers, in equity appreciation in the case of a warrant or other equity
security, or a reasonable interest rate premium, in the case of a debt instrument,” and to “provide
additional protection for the taxpayer against losses from sale of assets by the Secretary under this Act
and the administrative expenses of the TARP.” Id. § 113(d)(2).
51
CARES Act § 3102(d)(2).
52
Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, Comm.
on the Budget 1–2 (Apr. 27, 2020). The Act provided for expenditures of over $2 trillion, but the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) notes:
47

[T]he projected cost is less than [$2 trillion] because some of that assistance is in the form of loan
guarantees, which are not estimated to have a net effect on the budget. In particular, the act
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to provide up to $454 billion to fund emergency lending
facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Because the
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In addition to interventions like the CARES Act, current federal
monetary policy can also play an important—though incomplete—role in
managing widescale crises. The Federal Reserve has assisted in the COVID19 response through a wide variety of ad hoc mechanisms. These
mechanisms include cutting the target for the federal funds rate to 0% from
0.25% (which helps reduce borrowing costs for mortgages, car loans, student
loans, and other types of debt); purchasing securities in the market
(hearkening back to the “quantitative easing” strategies employed during the
2007 Financial Crisis, in which the Fed purchased trillions in securities such
as mortgage-backed instruments); 53 securities lending; supporting money
market mutual funds; and direct lending to financial institutions, major
employers, and state and municipal governments. 54 Such mechanisms are
designed to alleviate financial and economic pressures by providing capital
and liquidity that sustain financially stressed businesses during widescale
crises.
The Federal Reserve has also attempted to help local governments more
directly through the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), a funding
mechanism established by the CARES Act to help provide liquidity to state
and local governments affected by the COVID-19 crisis. 55 Under the
program, the facility is available to any state or city with more than 250,000
residents or county with more than 500,000 residents with a strong credit
rating. 56 The program provides up to $500 billion in funding through the
purchase of short-term debt.57 The debt is priced by reference to a floating
rate in addition to a “fixed spread” derived from the debt’s rating.58 Debt
proceeds must be used to help manage liquidity problems arising from
COVID-19, including cash flow effects resulting from deferred tax filings.59
Nevertheless, by November 30, 2020, the MLF was primarily utilized
by only two issuers, the state of Illinois and the New York Metropolitan
income and costs stemming from that lending are expected to roughly offset each other, CBO
estimates no deficit effect from that provision.
Id. at 2.
53
BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43413, COSTS OF GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A RETROSPECTIVE 32 (2018).
54
For a summary of the Federal Reserve’s efforts, see Jeffrey Cheng, Tyler Powell, Dave Skidmore
& David Wessel, What’s the Fed Doing in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis? What More Could It Do?,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/ [https://
perma.cc/5XRL-S7LZ].
55
Id.
56
FAQs: Municipal Liquidity Facility, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/municipal-liquidity-facility/municipal-liquidity-facility-faq [https://perma.cc/E8CP-9E4R].
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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Transportation Authority 60 and for relatively small amounts totaling only
$1.65 billion. 61 The Federal Reserve viewed the program primarily as a
mechanism to reassure investors who would be “comforted that the Fed was
standing by to meet the liquidity needs of state and local governments.”62
The program’s critics, however, argue that it was too restrictive, with eligible
issuers generally limited to large cities and counties.63 Issuers also reportedly
found the interest rates set by the Federal Reserve to be unattractively high—
with one estimate suggesting 97% of eligible cities, counties, and states
could be functionally excluded from the program because of pricing64—and
the maximum debt maturity to be unattractively short.65 The MLF was also
a fairly short-term program with the Federal Reserve buying state and local
debt instruments only up to December 31, 2020.66 Ultimately, while federal
financial support during the COVID-19 pandemic has been deeply needed,
federal efforts have proved to be insufficient: state and local governments
“have been battered by pandemic-related costs and collapsing tax revenues,

60
Colby Smith & Brooke Fox, US Businesses Race to Tap Fed Lending Before Year-End Expiry,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/c9cd9a01-4cbe-45e4-b369-ee796f11730e
[https://perma.cc/7KEJ-F4X5]; Yvette Shields, Illinois Pockets $2 Billion Fed Municipal Liquidity
Facility Loan, BOND BUYER (Dec. 18, 2020, 8:09 AM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/illinoispockets-2b-fed-mlf-loan [https://perma.cc/Q3XA-M7UK].
61
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING
LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
6 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-pmccf-smccf-talf-mlfppplf-msnlf-mself-msplf-nonlf-noelf-12-11-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EFL-L4R9]. The facility was
reportedly used again at the end of its expiry date for a total of $6.4 billion. Smith & Fox, supra note 60.
62
Sarah Wynn, Disagreement on the Role of the Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility, BOND BUYER
(Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/disagreement-on-the-role-of-the-feds-municipalliquidity-facility [https://perma.cc/5EGT-RB37].
63
POPULAR DEMOCRACY, AIMING TO UNDERACHIEVE: HOW A FEDERAL RESERVE LENDING
PROGRAM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IS DESIGNED TO FALL SHORT 2 (2020),
https://www.populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Aiming%20to%20Underachieve%20-%20Fed
%20Up%20White%20Paper%20June%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH7N-LF8U].
64
Id. at 3.
65
Id. at 6.
66
FAQs: Municipal Liquidity Facility, supra note 56. Other criticisms include concerns that the
program represents a misallocation of credit, with the Federal Reserve

reallocate[ing] purchasing power away from other entities in the market to those whose bonds the
Fed purchases. The cost to society is the difference between the value of the projects pursued by
state and local government with those resources and the value of the projects other entities could
have pursued with those same resources.
Alexander William Salter, The Fed’s State and Municipal Lending Is a Bad Idea, HILL (June 12, 2020,
8:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/502505-the-feds-state-and-municipal-lending-is-a-badidea [https://perma.cc/U56M-8FGX].
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[and] have already cut more than 1.3 million jobs.”67 Indeed, even the $900
billion relief package proposed in December 2020 would not be enough to
support people until the economy rebounds, as is expected to happen after
the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.68
Finally, emergency federal support through deficit spending, like the
CARES Act and Federal Reserve mechanisms, has another flaw. Unless
funds are set aside for moments of crisis, emergency appropriations typically
borrow from the future (and future generations) to pay for present expenses.69
With deficit spending, future generations inherit a burden without having had
the opportunity to vote on and approve it. By contrast, the resilience fund
described below borrows from the present (and current taxpayers) to pay for
future expenses. Therefore, with respect to intergenerational justice, a
resilience fund creates a more just option than deficit spending in the sense
that the polity is able to vote on and approve or disapprove of measures that
limit current expenditures.
B. State Rainy Day Funds
Unfortunately, states have limited options to mitigate problems arising
from budget shortfalls 70 and, like federal efforts, these options are often
insufficient in the face of large-scale crises. States can reduce spending
where possible and may also raise taxes. However, these are “procyclical
policies that not only disrupt public services and increase taxpayers’ burden,
but also worsen recessions and slow economic recoveries.” 71 Moreover,
because demand for many of the costliest public services, such as education
and social services, is fixed and inelastic, states may be limited in their ability
to significantly reduce spending without dramatically limiting services
through layoffs or other draconian measures.72
67
Jim Tankersley & Ben Casselman, A $900 Billion Plan Would Help the Economy, but Not Fix It,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/business/economy/congress-stimulus
-economy-impact.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/X9TJ-LABR].
68
Id.
69
Deficit spending, by definition, means that the costs of legislation are not covered by existing tax
revenues. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates the deficit impact of legislation
related to COVID-19 to be about $3.4 trillion. Breaking Down $3.4 Trillion in COVID Relief, COMM.
FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/breaking-down-3-4-trillion
-covid-relief [https://perma.cc/UD5U-Y3UX].
70
Bo Zhao, Saving for a Rainy Day: Estimating the Appropriate Size of U.S. State Budget
Stabilization Funds 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014), https://www.
bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/wp1412.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTR7-FNAQ].
71
Id.
72
Bo Zhao & David Coyne, Walking a Tightrope: Are U.S. State and Local Governments on a
Fiscally Sustainable Path? 1–2, 15, 31 tbl.3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 13-18, 2013),
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In addition to their limited ability to reduce spending, states also have a
limited ability to maintain services through deficit spending. Almost all
states have balanced budget amendments which prohibit state governments
from going into debt to finance government expenditures.73 Further, political
expediency may compel state governments to establish balanced budgets to
determine political survival. Governors and legislators cannot successfully
run for reelection with a budget in deficit.74 Crises also tend to have powerful
countercyclical effects: not only do revenues decrease, but service demands
also rise with the decrease in revenues and resources.75 State tax structures
exacerbate this effect as states are increasingly relying “on narrower, and
often more elastic tax basis such as personal income, and higher nominal
rates.”76
Local governments are also limited in the ways in which they can raise
revenue and cut spending in the event of a crisis requiring significant
economic resources. Because states have taken on greater responsibility for
funding high-cost social services like health care, state budget gaps may lead
localities to try to make up the difference by shifting resources from other

https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-department-working-paper/2013/walking-a-tightropeare-us-state-and-local-governments-on-a-fiscally-sustainable-path.aspx [https://perma.cc/N9F9-TXJR]
(finding evidence that education, social services and income maintenance, public safety, transportation,
and government administration expenditures “are income inelastic and that they are necessary goods for
the public”).
73
The exact number is debatable, depending on how explicit one reads the applicable amendment or
statutory provision:
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has traditionally reported that 49 states
must balance their budgets, with Vermont being the exception. Other authorities add Wyoming
and North Dakota as exceptions, and some authorities in Alaska contend that it does not have an
explicit requirement for a balanced budget. Two points can be made with certainty, however:
Most states have formal balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state
political cultures reinforce the requirements.
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2
(2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7LQQ-SSFS].
74
Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, Rainy Day Funds and Value at Risk, STATE TAX NOTES 563,
563 (2003), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/58781/1000606-Rainy-Day-Funds-and
-Value-at-Risk.PDF [https://perma.cc/9T3T-CUCJ].
75
Richard Mattoon, Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve State
Fiscal Performance 4 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2003-20, 2003), https://www.
chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2003/wp2003-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VJC-MPFH].
76
Id. Mattoon notes that states appear “reluctant to ‘fix’ their tax structures to better manage
volatility. In addition, it is unclear that revenue volatility is necessarily a bad thing if states are willing to
create budget stabilization tools. Efforts to broaden major tax bases, such as subjecting services to sales
taxation, have seen little progress.” Id.
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programs or, when possible, by increasing taxes. 77 Local governments,
however, face funding challenges created by state limitations on their ability
to raise revenue. Forty-two states place limitations on local governments’
property tax powers, and “the number of restrictions has expanded
extensively since [the] 1990s.” 78 Local governments also have increasing
federal and state mandates, which are not adequately funded through federal
and state aid, to provide services ranging from “criminal justice and public
safety, health and human services, transportation and infrastructure, to
administration of elections and property assessments.” 79 Thus, like state
governments, local governments have relatively inelastic budgets.
In the face of rising costs and limited options for increasing revenues,
almost all U.S. states have set up “rainy day funds” to help balance their
budgets in the event of a shortfall.80 Prior to COVID-19, state funds had
reached a record $74.9 billion in budget reserves.81 A Pew study estimates
that states could have continued government operations on these funds for a
median of 27.9 days (equivalent to 7.7% of total annual spending).82 The
insufficiency of rainy day funds is apparent from two crises in the past fifteen
years: the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 and the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.
State governments suffered a shortfall of approximately $690 billion in
the five years following the Financial Crisis. 83 Some states made
considerable use of those funds during the Financial Crisis and the “Great
Recession” that followed. According to Marlowe, “rainy day funds have
77

See State and Local Finance Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policycenters/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/stateand-local-expenditures [https://perma.cc/L4U8-SUHU] (showing public welfare spending, including
Medicaid spending, rising from 13% of state and local spending in 1977 to 22% in 2017).
78
JOEL GRIFFITH, JONATHAN HARRIS & EMILIA ISTRATE, DOING MORE WITH LESS: STATE REVENUE
LIMITATIONS & MANDATES ON COUNTY FINANCES 1 (Nat’l Ass’n of Counties Pol’y Rsch. Paper Series
Issue 5, 2016), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Doing%20More%20with%20Less_
Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2C9-36KK].
79
Id.
80
Barb Rosewicz, Justin Theal & Joe Fleming, States’ Financial Reserves Hit Record Highs, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/
2020/03/18/states-financial-reserves-hit-record-highs [https://perma.cc/G59A-8587]. The authors note
that “[s]tates use reserves and balances to manage budgetary uncertainty, including revenue forecasting
errors, budget gaps during economic downturns, and other unforeseen emergencies, such as natural
disasters. This financial cushion can soften the need for severe spending cuts or tax increases when states
need to balance their budgets.” Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Childress et al., supra note 8 (citing ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, MICHAEL LEACHMAN & JOSHUAH
MARSHALL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES NEED SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FISCAL RELIEF
TO SLOW THE EMERGING DEEP RECESSION 12–13 (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/4-14-20sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ3A-Z6TD]).
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been the best (and in some cases the only) tool” for states in mending the
destruction of states’ economies following the Great Recession.84 As noted
in a McKinsey report, however, “[t]wenty-eight states drained their rainyday funds to a point where they had less than a week’s worth of operating
costs; 17 used them entirely.”85 For other states, flaws in the design of their
rainy day funds discouraged the use of the funds, despite the severity of the
crisis. Missouri’s constitution, for example, requires that any withdrawals
from the state rainy day fund be paid back within three years, with interest,
and that the state must redeposit in each of those years at least a third of the
amount withdrawn.86 As a result, states saw significant reductions in health,
education, and other social services from the Financial Crisis. 87 With the
COVID-19 pandemic coming soon after, states were again pushed to the
brink.
Given the severity of COVID-19’s financial implications, states were
faced with a clear need to draw down on their rainy day funds. In Ohio, for
example, the state’s rainy day fund provided the state with “financial
firepower to withstand the fiscal assault brought on by COVID-19,” and,
because of the fund, the state did not have to rely on tax increases or federal
loans to cover the expenses.88 As with the Financial Crisis, however, the
funds’ limited sizes have hampered their effectiveness. As shown in the
graphs below,89 funds from state rainy day funds cover only about 8.5% of
states’ fiscal needs in aggregate. While rainy day funds were at historically
high levels prior to the COVID-19 crisis, most (if not all) do not have
sufficient funding to help states cover the losses from 2020—let alone the
84
Justin Marlowe, What’s the Point of Rainy Day Funds?, GOVERNING (June 2013),
https://www.governing.com/archive/colpoint-of-rainy-day-funds.html [https://perma.cc/BRM6-YZRJ].
85
Childress et al., supra note 8.
86
STEPHEN BAILEY, BRENNA ERFORD, KIL HUH, AKSHAY IYENGAR, AIRLIE LOIACONI, PATRICK
MURRAY, ROBERT ZAHRADNIK & ALEXANDRIA ZHANG, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., WHEN TO USE STATE
RAINY DAY FUNDS: WITHDRAWAL POLICIES TO MITIGATE VOLATILITY AND PROMOTE STRUCTURALLY
BALANCED BUDGETS 12–13 (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/04/when-to-usestate-rainy-day-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AAU-HZLA].
87
In response to the 2007 Financial Crisis, “[m]ost states cut spending.” Tracy Gordon, State and
Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/
articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/US94-M9KX]. Cuts fell
predominantly in education, health, and social services, where states also dedicate most of their budgets.
Id.
88
THE BUCKEYE INST., POLICY MEMO: USING THE RAINY DAY FUND TO FIGHT COVID-19’S
IMPACT 1 (2020), https://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/library/docLib/2020-04-15-The-Buckeye-InstituteStrategic-Use-of-Ohio-s-Rainy-Day-Fund-Along-with-Budget-Cuts-Would-Avoid-Tax-Increasespolicy-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD8L-7YKP].
89
See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 67 tbl.25, 69
figs.4 & 5 (2019), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-b7500fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Fiscal%20Survey/NASBO_Fall_2019_Fiscal_Survey_of_States_S.pdf
[https://perma.cc/236E-DQDX].
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expected downturns in 2021 and beyond. Indeed, ten states tapped their rainy
day funds within the first few months of the crisis. Some states’ rainy day
funds were so scant “that, even if they were entirely drained, there wouldn’t
be enough cash to help the states through a fine mist, much less a rainy
day.”90 Nevada, for example, quickly used all of the $401 million in its rainy
day fund to help cover the shortfall resulting from the pandemic, which for
fiscal year 2020 alone is expected to range from $741 million to $911
million.91
FIGURE 1: U.S. STATE RAINY DAY FUND BALANCES (BILLIONS)
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Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, The Draining of State Rainy Day Funds, ROUTE FIFTY (Oct.
13, 2020), https://www.route-fifty.com/finance/2020/10/draining-state-rainy-day-funds/169194/ [https://
perma.cc/4H8Q-6NLU].
91
Board Drains Nevada’s Rainy Day Fund to Deal with Pandemic Financial Crisis, NEV. APPEAL
(Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/2020/may/15/board-drains-nevadas-rainy-dayfund-to-deal-with-p/ [https://perma.cc/6PFW-HAMB].
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FIGURE 2: U.S. STATE RAINY DAY FUND BALANCES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES
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In an extensive review of the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on state
and local budgets, taking into account the mitigating effect of state rainy day
funds, a Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland study suggests that income and
sales revenues will decline by $54 billion in fiscal year 2020.92 An additional
$25 billion to $137 billion in revenue may be lost, depending on the speed
of the recovery.93 Rainy day funds may reduce the loss to $21 billion in 2020
and $4 billion to $78 billion in 2021.94 State rainy day funds thus provide
significant mitigation, but not nearly enough to stave off a substantial
diminution in essential governmental services.
In sum, the federal responses to COVID-19 and the Financial Crisis of
2007–2008 revealed that the federal government’s crisis efforts are slow and
inefficient at responding to local needs. Additionally, in the case of dramatic,
large-scale crises like pandemics, national resources may also be
insufficient. State rainy day funds may fill some gaps, but they are too small
in size and are subject to political calculations that make it less likely that
they would be used to manage crises in their early stages.

92
STEPHAN D. WHITAKER, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND, ESTIMATES OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUE LOSSES FROM PANDEMIC MITIGATION 1 (2020), https://www.clevelandfed.org/
newsroom-and-events/publications/cfed-district-data-briefs/cfddb-20200513-estimates-of-state-andlocal-government-revenue-losses-from-pandemic-mitigation.aspx [https://perma.cc/4VT6-KCQ5].
93
Id.
94
Id.
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III. DEVELOPING A NATIONAL RESILIENCE FUND
In a moment characterized by compounding crises and inadequate
financial tools at every level, something more is needed. A resilience fund
would go far in filling this gap. This Part describes how a national resilience
fund, with subaccounts created for each state and territory, would help state
and local governments respond to the crises that are likely to arise in the
coming years. A national resilience fund could be based on a familiar,
flexible structure that has already been in use for decades: the
Unemployment Trust Fund. 95 Such a structure would help insulate the
resilience fund from local political pressures. It would also have the financial
strength to help state and local governments absorb the costs associated with
severe crises such as pandemics and natural disasters, thereby helping to
preserve governmental legitimacy in times of severe social stress.
A. Building a National Resilience Fund
The concept of a national-level stabilization fund, designed to alleviate
budget crises similar to the resilience fund proposed here, has been in use for
decades in other countries. As with a resilience fund, governments use
budget stabilization-oriented funds to help manage unexpected economic
downturns.96 In the United States, the notion of creating a national fund that
could absorb state and local budgetary shocks also has some precedent. In a
2003 publication, for example, Federal Reserve economist Richard Mattoon
suggested a federal version of a rainy day fund, with separate subaccounts
for each state, that could be deployed to respond to larger crises that current
rainy day funds cannot manage.97
Mattoon identified a number of justifications for a national fund as
opposed to simply increasing funding for state rainy day funds.98 The politics
of rainy day funds, for example, present significant barriers to expanding
existing state funds.99 A number of states already have relatively low caps on
the amount of money that may be reserved in the rainy day fund; of the fortyone states with caps, nine restrict the fund to 5% or less of the state’s total
expenditures or revenues.100 Because the funds are typically part of the state
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See infra Section III.A.1.
See, e.g., Xie Ping & Chen Chao, The Theoretical Logic of Sovereign Wealth Funds 24 (June 16,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1420618 [https://perma.cc/X7T4-SZN5]
(describing the use of sovereign wealth funds as, among other things, budget stabilization mechanisms).
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See Mattoon, supra note 75, at 4.
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Id. at 3–4.
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Id. at 3.
100
TAX POL’Y CTR., BRIEFING BOOK 668 (2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/
files/briefing-book/tpc_briefing_book_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPX8-REM9].
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constitution, increasing the fund’s limits may require a change to the state
constitution and would necessitate either an increase in tax or a decrease in
services. 101 With state budgets already struggling to meet current
expenditures and facing budgetary headwinds as they move into the future,102
it seems unlikely that states could muster the political will to set aside funds
that would otherwise be used on existing needs to prepare for future
challenges. Such existing needs include dramatic increases in state Medicaid
spending, which is now the greatest expense after K–12 education. 103
Additionally, pension costs also create significant challenges for state
budgets. Unfunded pension benefits were the “most prominent, and fastestgrowing of a selection of future costs facing states as of 2013.”104 Despite the
strong performance of the stock market in recent years, plan liabilities
continue to outpace asset growth. The Pew Charitable Trusts estimates the
total national funding gap to be around $1.37 trillion.105 Finally, demographic
change due to a long-term trend of slower population growth will limit
economic growth and place additional pressures on state budgets.106 All of
these factors reveal the limits of state rainy day funds and demonstrate the
importance, if not the necessity, of providing an additional funding structure
that can help respond to major crises. The following sections briefly outline
a solution.
1. Fund Structure
A federal resilience fund could be created using a well-established
model: the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). As part of the New Deal, the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 created an “Unemployment
Compensation” (UC) program. 107 The system was structurally federalist,
with some funding provided by federal payroll taxes and other funding

101
For a detailed review of the state provisions governing rainy day funds, see NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, RAINY DAY FUND STRUCTURES 8 (2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
Documents/fiscal/RDF_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB4G-C8YF].
102
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 89, at vii.
103
Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind0 [https://perma.cc/YGF2ZJME].
104
Id.
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David Draine, Keith Sliwa & Emma Wei, Public Pension Investments Largely Recover After
Pandemic-Related Slide, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/articles/2020/08/25/public-pension-investments-largely-recover-after-pandemicrelated-slide [https://perma.cc/8DNY-GSA3].
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Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, supra note 103.
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JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22954, THE UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND
(UTF): STATE INSOLVENCY AND FEDERAL LOANS TO STATES 1 (2018).
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through state taxes. 108 These funds were (and still are) deposited into the
UTF, which pays out benefits to help manage spikes in unemployment
during economic crises. 109 The UTF operates countercyclically, building
funds in prosperous times and paying out in lean times:
When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax
revenues. At the same time, UC program spending falls because fewer workers
are unemployed. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending
on benefits dampens demand in the economy. It also creates a surplus of funds,
or a reserve fund, for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. These
reserve balances are credited in the state’s account within the UTF. During an
economic slowdown or recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program
spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The
increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the
economic effect of lost earnings by injecting additional funds into the
economy.110

States have varying levels of “solvency” in the fund;111 some states have
more funds available than they would typically need to pay claims in a given

108
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act imposes “on every employer” a 6% tax on total wages.
26 U.S.C.§ 3301. Most of the funding comes from the states. JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44527, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT
TAX (FUTA) 1 (2016) (explaining that during “periods of economic expansion or stability, states fund
approximately 90% of all UC expenditures—as almost all of the benefits are state financed by state
unemployment taxes”).
109
WHITTAKER, supra note 107.
110
Id.
111
The U.S. Department of Labor reports that, as of February 2020, the solvency levels of thirty-one
states are “greater than or at the recommended minimum solvency standard.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF.
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INS., DIV. OF FISCAL & ACTUARIAL SERVS., STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
TRUST FUND SOLVENCY REPORT 2–3 (2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/trustFundSolv
Report2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ64-L7H3]. Twenty-two states and jurisdictions had solvency levels
below the recommend standard. Id. Solvency can be determined by several different methods. The
Department of Labor uses a method by which they calculate the Reserve Ratio for a state:

The simplest solvency measure called the Reserve Ratio is derived by taking the trust fund balance
and dividing by the state’s total wages paid for the year . . . . This measure can be compared
against the level of benefits paid in the year divided by the same yearly wages- this ratio is referred
to as the Benefit Cost Rate. A common comparison is to take the highest Benefit Cost Rate in the
state’s history and compare it to the Reserve Ratio, or to take the average of the three highest
Benefit Cost Rates in the last twenty years and compare that to the Reserve Ratio (this is called
the Average High Cost Multiple). In the latter case, values greater than one (Reserve Ratio divided
by Average Benefit Cost Rate) are considered the minimum level for adequate state solvency
going into a recession . . . .
Id.
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year.112 In cases in which states do not have sufficient funds, they are able to
borrow from the federal government under a loan program.113
A similar countercyclical model could be employed for a national
resilience fund, with taxes collected during “normal” times and funds spent
during crises. States have put in place a wide variety of regulations on how
rainy day funds are created, funded, drawn down, and replenished. 114
Withdrawal from a rainy day fund is triggered by adverse events including
economic downturns, health crises, and natural disasters, or simply budget
shortfalls. 115 As with rainy day funds, states would need to develop
procedures for determining resilience fund mechanisms and withdrawals. As
described below, creating specific budgetary triggers—and coordinating
their use with the rainy day fund—would help ensure the fund is used as
intended.
2. Funding Mechanisms
Rainy day funds are typically funded through year-end budget
surpluses; tax revenues exceeding a certain amount; and proceeds from the
sale of oil, gas, or mineral rights; among many other methods.116 Similar to
the UTF, a national resilience fund need not require a specific source of
funds, only that the account be built up to a specific threshold—for example,
15% of prior year expenditures117 —through contribution rules that would
take a very small percentage of 1%–1.5% of general fund revenues. To
facilitate the buildup of funds, a national wealth tax118 applied to very large
fortunes over a certain threshold could provide additional funding.119
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WHITTAKER, supra note 107, at 9 tbl.2.
Id. at 4.
114
See generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 101 (outlining various state
differences in rainy day fund formation).
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See id. at 8–23 (listing methods of withdrawal and events that trigger withdrawal from rainy day
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See generally id. (listing methods of deposit to rainy day funds by each state).
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Mattoon suggests such an amount for his rainy day fund, but given the severity of crises state and
local governments may face, the total amount may need to be higher. Mattoon, supra note 75, at 14.
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See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1486 (2018) (arguing that a
wealth tax would be justified because “a constraint on economic inequality may in fact be necessary to
preserve individual autonomy. . . . [U]nder the relative economic power theory excessive economic
inequality suppresses the preferences of those with less economic power”).
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Saez and Zucman, for example, model a wealth tax for fortunes of $50 million or more.
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, Fall 2019, at 437, 440–41, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/SaezZuchman-final-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGZ7-Z6WE].
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3. Withdrawal Mechanisms
Withdrawal provisions define the circumstances under which funds
may be drawn down. A withdrawal policy for a national resilience fund
would allow for withdrawal of funds during defined severe budget crises
caused by major shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Among other
purposes, a withdrawal policy may allow for withdrawals in the event of
revenue shortfalls, revenue growth below a certain trend, general economic
downturns, and health or safety emergencies.120 Clear rules would maintain
state incentives to manage their budgets wisely, and withdrawal restrictions
should limit the amount that may be withdrawn in any given year to ensure
that funds are available for additional unexpected crises. For example, as
with rainy day funds, the fund may have a rule that only 33% may be
withdrawn in a given year, with up to 50% available if extreme conditions
are met.121
4. Managing the Fund
As with the UTF, a national resilience fund could be managed through
the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Treasury has the expertise and capacity to
provide necessary administrative services and has years of experience with
analogous funds.122 A federally managed fund has another benefit: it would
limit the temptation presented by a large state fund to use the money for
politically advantageous but inappropriate expenditures—a temptation that
would seem to grow in proportion to the size of the fund. Strong structural
and governance protections are necessary to provide adequate insulation of
the fund from political pressures. The federalist structure of a federally
managed state account would also help insulate a national fund from federal
officials who would be prevented from accessing the state funds for federal
purposes. Likewise, state officials would also be prevented from accessing
the funds directly, as the fund would only pay out in defined circumstances.
This shelter from both federal and state political pressures would allow the
fund to accumulate larger reserves without creating a temptingly large, statecontrolled fund.123 Importantly, however, a national resilience fund would
120

See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text.
In his discussion of a national rainy day fund, Mattoon suggests that states “should be permitted
to withdrawal up to half of their existing balance in a given year” but should have to show severe
economic need through measures such as “a drop in real revenue over the preceding year or an increase
in unemployment by 1% or more or a decline in personal income.” Mattoon, supra note 75, at 18.
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Such funds could be administered through the Office of Fiscal Service, which “oversees the
development and implementation of policies relating to the government’s cash management, operations,
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U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/domestic-finance/fiscal-service
[https://perma.cc/A59K-L88D].
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provide for state fiscal autonomy while not supplanting important existing
federal resources such as the Unemployment Trust Fund, the Disaster Relief
Fund, and—in cases where national resources must be coordinated—
emergency legislation and appropriations.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, state rainy day funds held
approximately $75 billion in assets.124 The pandemic is expected to create
budget shortfalls of over $555 billion for fiscal years 2020–2022 alone.125
The amount of funds available for state governments will not be enough to
meet current budget needs, let alone help manage inevitable crises in the
coming years. A national resilience fund could be a key fiscal tool in helping
states manage the black elephant risks associated with climate change,
economic dislocation, pandemics, and systemic injustice.
While specific details would need to be developed and negotiated, the
concept of the national fund sketched out here would dramatically improve
the resiliency of state and local finances in the face of serious crises. A fund
that is built up over time would be able to mechanically and painlessly
provide assistance to states without simply shifting costs to the federal
government, as would be the case in a direct federal bailout. Federal
assistance in a crisis is not certain, and, as Mattoon notes, “[t]he federal
government is often in no better fiscal shape in a recession than the states
and is likely to be grudging in helping states out of a bind.”126 A national
resilience fund with separate state accounts would motivate the federal
government to provide state and local support during crises, as the funds
would not be eligible for allocation at the federal level.
Finally, a national fund would benefit the federal government by
“smoothing state fiscal reaction to recessions,” which could “reduce the drag
that state tax increases or expenditure cuts might have on the national
economy.”127 While it would not solve the long-term structural challenges
involved in raising revenues and complying with partially funded mandates,
a national fund would at least provide a shock absorption mechanism for
state and local governments that provide many of the services essential to
legitimate governmental function. Such an ex ante fund would thus help
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retain government legitimacy during future, inevitable crises due to climate
change, economic dislocation, pandemics, and systemic injustice.
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